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Abstract
In a framework or repeated-purchase experience goods with seller’s moral
hazard and imperfect monitoring, umbrella branding may improve the terms
of the implicit contract between seller and buyers, whereby the seller invests
in quality and buyers pay a high price. The benefits from umbrella branding
may come from one of two sources: in some cases, umbrella branding leads
to a softer punishment of product failure, which increases the seller’s value. In
other cases, umbrella branding leads to a harsher punishment of product failure,
which allows for an equilibrium where buyers trust in the seller’s brand. Against
these benefits, one must consider the costs of umbrella branding, namely that,
in some cases, a bad signal in one product kills two streams of revenue and
profit. Combining costs and benefits, I determine the set of parameter values
where umbrella branding is an optimal strategy.
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1 Introduction
Umbrella branding, the practice of labeling more than one product with a single
brand name, is common practice among multiproduct firms in a variety of mar-
kets.1 Examples include Canon cameras and photocopiers, Colgate toothpaste and
toothbrushes, Levi’s jeans and sneakers. To underscore the importance of the strat-
egy of umbrella branding, Aaker and Keller (1990) quote a Nielsen report according
to which “from 1977 to 1984, approximately 40% of the 120 to 175 new brands that
were introduced into supermarkets annually were extensions” (p. 27).
In this paper, I propose a model that highlights the costs and benefits of umbrella
branding and ultimately provides the basis for a theory of optimal umbrella size.
I consider a framework or repeated-purchase experience goods with seller’s moral
hazard. Firms have a short-run incentive to reduce quality and save costs, as con-
sumers can only observe quality ex post. However, there exist equilibria whereby
firms refrain from cheating consumers. In these equilibria, when consumers infer
that the firm has cheated them, the firm’s reputation breaks down, whereby con-
sumers no longer pay a high price for the firm’s product and the firm no longer
produces quality products.2
I show that umbrella branding may improve the terms of the “implicit contract”
between firm and consumers. This may happen for two reasons. First, umbrella
branding may provide for a harsher punishment on cheating sellers. For example,
suppose that a low-quality product fails with probability 1 − β. If a firm sells
two products under different names and consumers punish each product failure
separately, then the the probability that cheating is detected in a given product is
given by 1−β. If however the firm sells both products under the same name and the
firm is punished in both products following any product failure, then the probability
of punishment given that the firm shirks in both products is given by 1− β2, which
is greater than 1− β.
A second reason why umbrella branding may improve equilibrium payoff is that,
if there is slack in the no-deviation constraint, consumers may be more lenient with a
firm that sells two products under the same name. Specifically, there exist parameter
values such that the threat of punishing a firm only when two simultaneous product
failures take place is sufficient to keep the firm from shirking; and lowering the
probability of punishment increases equilibrium payoff.
Generically, if the value of the discount factor is very high then the optimal
1The terms “brand extension” or “brand stretching” are also used. Some authors distinguish
between “line extension” (when the new product is in the same class) and “brand extension,” when
the new product is in a different class. Given the level of generality of the model considered in this
paper, this distinction is not crucial.
2See Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983).
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equilibrium is for the seller to umbrella brand and for consumers to punish the seller
only if two simultaneous product failures take place. For lower values of the discount
factor, no umbrella branding is optimal. For still lower values of the discount factor,
the optimal equilibrium is for the seller to umbrella branding and for consumers to
punish the seller for any product failure. Finally, if the discount factor is very low
then the only equilibrium is the repetition of the static Nash equilibrium (where no
quality products are sold)
Related literature. There is a fairly sizeable literature on brand extension
and umbrella branding. One first explanation for brand extensions is that umbrella
branding is a form of economies of scope, as it economizes on the costs of creating
a new brand. Tauber (1988), for example, argues that
World-competitive pressures and slow-growth markets keep cost contain-
ment as a primary management imperative. In this environment, growth
through brand leverage will continue to flourish (p. 30).
A related idea is that brands have an intrinsic value (status or otherwise). Brands
are therefore like a “public good” in the sense that the more products are sold under
the same brand the greater the total value created. See Pepall and Richards (2002).
A different perspective on brand extensions is that, in a world where consumers
are uncertain about product characteristics (due to horizontal or vertical differenti-
ation), brands may play an informational role. As the Economist argues (July 2nd,
1994),
Brands are created because buyers crave information. They see a huge
range of products that look the same and seem to perform similar.
Brands offer a route through the confusion.
Wernerfelt (1988) suggests that, if umbrella branding is costly, then it may serve
as a signal of new product quality that is used by high-quality firms only. In a
similar context (adverse selection), Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1992) show that,
in a free-entry equilibrium, single-product and multiple-product (umbrella) brands
coexist. Still in a similar context, Cabral (2000) studies the direct and feed-back
reputational effects of brand extensions.
In a framework of horizontal product differentiation, Sappington and Wernerfelt
(1985) argue that umbrella branding may reduce uncertainty about a new product’s
attributes, a fact that increases value if consumers are risk averse. They also present
empirical evidence consistent with the predictions of their model.3 Choi and Scarpa
(1992) show that a benefit of umbrella branding is to credibly deter entry.
3Other papers that include empirical evidence relating to brand extensions include Aaker and
Keller (1990), Sullivan (1990) and Erdem (1998).
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More closely related to my paper, Choi (1998) proposes a moral-hazard theory
of brand extensions. In a repeated-game framework, sellers introduce high-quality
products and buyers pay a high price for them. Buyers can observe quality ex post
and punish sellers who cheat by introducing low-quality products; the nature of
the punishment is that future introductions are no longer believed to be of high
quality as before. My paper differs from Choi (1998), among other things, in that
it considers the costs, not only the benefits, from umbrella branding.
Recent work that is closely related to mine includes Cai and Obara (2006) and
Hakenes and Peitz (2004). Cai and Obara consider a repeated game framework sim-
ilar to mine. However, they assume that sellers make a once-and-for-all investment
in product quality. Moreover, the integrated firm case, which is their equivalent to
umbrella branding, assumes that quality decisions are the same across all products.
They therefore address a different set of issues. In particular, one of the impor-
tant issues in my model is precisely whether the binding constraint under umbrella
branding is to shirk on one product or to shirk in both products. Hakenes and
Peitz consider a firm that sells a product in each of two periods and must decide
on product quality at the beginning of the first period. Again, my approach differs
from theirs in that I consider repeated quality decisions.
Two additional recent papers are Thal (2006) and Dana and Spier (2006), both
of which make important contributions to the umbrella branding literatures. Thal
develops a model in the line of Cabral (2000) but considers the case when the seller
can choose the degree of correlation between the products sold under the same
umbrella (whereas Cabral, 2000, assumes such correlation as exogenously given).
Dana and Spier address the important case when consumers are small and receive
imperfect private signals, which in turn makes the task of punishing shirking more
difficult. In the end of Section 3 I will touch on the issue of private monitoring.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I consider
the case when the seller’s quality choices are perfectly observable. In this context,
I show that umbrella branding has no equilibrium effects. The result is similar to
Bernheim and Whinston’s (1990) irrelevance result in the context of multimarket
contact. In Section 3, I consider the case of imperfect monitoring. I characterize
the optimal solution under umbrella branding, compare it to the optimal solution
under no-umbrella branding, and characterize the overall optimal equilibrium.
2 Deterministic quality
Consider a firm that exists for an infinite number of periods and must decide, at
the beginning of each period, whether or not to spend effort into producing quality
products; a product is of high quality if and only if the firm spends effort on it, at
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a cost .
The good in question is an experience good. Specifically, consumers observe ex-
post whether a product performs well or rather breaks down. Product performance
is batch specific, so all consumers observe the same performance outcome. If the
product is of low quality, then it breaks down with probability one; if the product
is of high quality, then it works with probability one.4 Consumers value products
that work (high-quality products) at pi and products that do not work (low-quality
products) at zero.
I assume that, in the eyes of consumers, a firm’s history is encapsulated in the
value of its brand. I moreover assume that a firm’s brand can take two values:
trustworthy or not trustworthy. This assumption is motivated by the belief that
consumers have finite capabilities to process information, and thus encapsulate a
firm’s history into a coarse measure consisting of a finite number of states.5
Finally, I consider a simple class of consumer strategies: in each period, con-
sumers are willing to pay a price that is a function of the firm’s brand value; and
upon observation of the firm’s quality level they update their belief regarding the
brand’s trustworthiness. Throughout most of the paper, I assume this updating
is deterministic. Later in the paper I also consider the possibility of consumers
randomizing.
Regarding parameter values, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 1  < pi.
Assumption 1 implies that the efficient solution is for the firm to produce high-
quality products: the added value it creates more than compensates for the extra
cost. And to the extent that the seller can extract the consumer’s surplus, it also
implies that the seller’s optimal solution is to produce high-quality products.
To summarize, the timing in each period is as follows. First, the firm decides
whether to spend  in order to produce a high-quality product. Then consumers,
who classify the firm as being trustworthy or not, decide whether to buy from the
firm and, if so, pay a price equal to the expected value of the product given their
beliefs about product quality. Finally, consumers who purchased the product update
their beliefs regarding the firm (trustworthy or not).
The above model and type of consumer strategy is essentially the model of quality
provision proposed by Klein and Leffler (1981).6 If the game were played only once,
then no high-quality products would be produced. In fact, it is the firm’s dominant
strategy in the one-shot game not to make any effort to provide quality. However, if
4In the next section, I relax the assumption of deterministic quality levels.
5See Monte (2006), Wilson and Ekmekci (2006).
6See also Telser (1980), Shapiro (1983).
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the game is repeated an infinite number of times, then there may exist equilibria such
that high quality products are sold. In the present context, the quality assurance
equilibrium works as follows. Let all consumers start by considering the firm’s brand
trustworthy, meaning consumers expect the firm to offer quality products. As long
as the firm does so, that is, as long as consumers observe high quality, consumers
continue to consider the brand to be trustworthy, that is, to expect high quality and
pay the corresponding price p = pi. If at any time consumers observe a low quality
product, then they lose their trust in the firm and stop purchasing from it.
Formally, the consumer’s strategy is to buy at a price pi if the brand is trustwor-
thy and not to buy if the brand is not trustworthy; and a brand is trusted if and
only if it was trustworthy before the current period and high quality was observed
in the current period. The firm’s strategy is to make effort to offer high quality
if and only its brand is considered trustworthy by consumers. One of the central
results in Klein and Leffler (1981) is that, if the firm sells frequently enough, then
the above is indeed a Nash equilibrium. Let δ be the firm’s discount factor. Define
an optimal equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium that maximizes the firm’s
expected discounted profit. We then have the following result.7
Proposition 1 (Klein and Leffler) If δ > /pi, then the following is an optimal
equilibrium: (a) the seller chooses high-quality if an only if consumers trust its brand;
(b) consumers purchase from the seller (at price pi) if and only if they consider the
brand to be trustworthy; (c) the brand is trustworthy if and only if past products sold
under that brand have performed well.
So far, the analysis corresponds to the standard repeated-game approach to rela-
tional contracting. The only value added of the above is to cast such approach in a
particular framework that features a formal rule of trust in a brand name. Next, I
consider the extension of this framework in the context of a firm selling two products.
I do so first in the a deterministic context and then, in Section 3, in an imperfect
monitoring context.
Two-product firms and umbrella branding. I now consider the case of a
firm that sells two products. Specifically, I consider an economy with a continuum
of firms. Each firm is endowed with two products and faces two main decisions: At
time of birth, it must decide whether to sell both products under the same name,
or rather under different names. Then, in each period, it must choose the quality
level of each of its products. I assume that effort is independent across products,
that is, producing a high-quality product 1 costs  regardless of the effort choice in
the other product.
7The proof of this and the remaining results in the paper may be found in the Appendix.
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The firm’s choice of name is important because consumers cannot observe the
ownership of each brand:
Assumption 2 (brand ownership) Consumers observe brand names but not the
identity of each brand owner.
A consequence of Assumption 2 is that, if a firm does not umbrella brand, then
consumers consider the firm’s products are being offered by separate firms.
I now show that, under deterministic quality levels, the case I have been consid-
ering in this section, umbrella branding has no impact on firm profits.
Proposition 2 (irrelevance of umbrella branding) Under perfect information,
firm profits are the same with or without umbrella branding.
The result is similar to Proposition 1 in Bernheim and Whiston (1990). Intuitively,
adding a second product doubles a firm’s value along the equilibrium path, but it
also doubles the gain from shirking on offering quality products. In other words,
the entire no-deviation constraint is multiplied by two, leading to the same solution
as under no umbrella branding.
In the next section, I consider the case of imperfect monitoring, that is, the case
when observed quality is a stochastic function of firm effort. I will show that the
Bernheim-Whinston irrelevance result breaks down.
3 Stochastic quality level
Consider now the case of random quality level. As before, consumers cannot observe
quality ex ante, only ex post. Now I add the assumption that (a) there is a stochastic
relation between effort and quality and (b) consumers only observe quality, not
effort. Specifically, I assume that if the firm makes effort, then its product works
with probability α, whereas low effort leads to a product that works with probability
β < α. For simplicity, I now assume that consumers value a product that at pi/α,
so expected value given firm effort is pi.
I first consider the extension to imperfect monitoring of the case of one-product
firms. The problem at hand is, again, to find an equilibrium that maximizes the
firm’s expected discounted payoff.
Proposition 3 If δ > /(αpi), then the following is an optimal equilibrium: (a)
the seller chooses high-quality if an only if consumers trust its brand; (b) consumers
purchase from the seller (at price pi) if and only if they consider the brand to be
trustworthy; (c) the brand is trustworthy if and only if past products sold under that
brand have performed well.
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Notice that Proposition 3 is nearly identical to Proposition 1, with two important
differences. First, the lower bound on the discount factor is higher, thus there may be
values of δ such that quality provision is an equilibrium under perfect monitoring but
not under imperfect monitoring. Second, the firm’s value is lower under imperfect
monitoring: (pi−)/(1−δ α), as opposed to (pi−)/(1−δ) under perfect monitoring.
Notice also that, as expected, the relevant values are continuous in α, so the perfect
monitoring case obtains as the limit as α converges to 1.
Two-product firms and umbrella branding. Analogously to Section 2, I
now consider the case of a firm that sells two products. As before, the firm’s strategy
has two components: at time of birth, it must decide whether to sell both products
under the same name, or rather under different names; and then, in each period,
it must choose the quality level of each of its products. The consumers’ strategy
is now a little more complicated than before. In each period, the outcome is one
of three cases: no failure, failure of one product, failure of both products. In each
case, consumers must decide whether or not to lose trust in the brand.
As before, I look for the optimal equilibrium from the firm’s point of view, that
is, the equilibrium leading to the highest discounted value. I also refer to a quality
provision equilibrium, or simply a quality equilibrium, as one where the seller starts
off by offering quality products (unlike the one-shot game equilibrium). My main
result is as follows:
Proposition 4 For each set of values α, β, , pi, there exist threshold values 0 <
δ1 ≤ δ2 ≤ δ3 ≤ 1, such that
• If δ < δ1, then no quality provision equilibrium exists, that is, the only equi-
librium is the repetition of the static game equilibrium.
• If δ1 < δ < δ2, then the optimal equilibrium is for the seller to umbrella brand
and consumers to lose trust following any product failure.
• If δ2 < δ < δ3, then the optimal equilibrium is for the seller not to umbrella
brand.
• If δ > δ3, then the optimal equilibrium is for the seller to umbrella brand and
consumers to lose trust following two simultaneous product failures only.
Moreover, there exist values 1, 2 such that
• If  < 1, then δ1 < δ2 < δ3
• If 1 <  < 2, then δ1 = δ2 < δ3
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• If  > 2, then δ1 = δ2 = δ3
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 4. Consider first the case when  is small, say  = 0,
so that the gains from offering a quality equilibrium are particularly high. For this
value of  (and for the values of pi, α and β considered in the figure), we obtain
three thresholds for the value of the discount factor δ. If the discount factor is
very low, specifically if δ < δ1, then no equilibrium exists where the seller offers
quality products, either with or without umbrella branding. If δ1 < δ < δ2, then
the optimal equilibrium is for the seller to umbrella brand and for consumers to
lose trust following any product failure. For higher values of the discount factor,
δ2 < δ < δ3, the optimal equilibrium is for the seller not to umbrella brand. In
this case, the equilibrium in each product (and each brand) follows Proposition 3.
Finally, for very high values of the discount factor, δ > δ3, the optimal equilibrium
is for the seller to umbrella brand and for consumers to lose trust following two
simultaneous product failures only.
More generally, the optimal solution is as follows: in region UB2, follow umbrella
branding and the simultaneous failure policy; in region UB1+ , follow umbrella brand-
ing and the policy of punishing any failure; in region “no UB,” sell the two products
under separate names. Finally, in the southeast region (low δ or high ) the optimal
solution is to play the repeated Nash equilibrium (no quality provision).
Notice that the thresholds δi are only weakly increasing in i. It is quite possible
that δ1 = δ2 or/and δ2 = δ3. In fact, if 1 <  < 2 then δ1 = δ2, so that the optimal
equilibrium is either UB2 or no umbrella branding. If 2 <  < 3, δ1 = δ2 = δ3, so
that the optimal policy is either the static Nash equilibrium or UB2.
In order to understand the intuition for the main results, it helps to re-write the
no deviation constraint as follows:
(pi − ) + δ ρ (pi − )
1− ρ δ ≥ pi + δ ρ
′ (pi − )
1− ρ δ , (1)
where ρ is the continuation probability along the equilibrium path and ρ′ the con-
tinuation probability following a deviation. Defining ξ ≡ pi− , (1) is equivalent
to
δ ≥ ξ
(ρ− ρ′) + ρ ξ
This conditions shows that there are two factors that determine the lowest value
of δ such that a quality equilibrium exists: the continuation probability, ρ, and the
difference in continuation probabilities between the equilibrium action and shirking,
ρ− ρ′. The higher either of these is (everything else constant), the lower the lower
bound on the value of δ. Moreover, the higher ξ (that is, the lower the efficiency
gains from quality provision), the greater the relative importance of ρ vis-a-vis ρ−ρ′.
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Figure 1: Optimal equilibrium as a function of cost of effort, , and the discount
factor, δ (assuming pi = 1, α = .9, β = .6).
Under no umbrella branding, ρ = α and ρ′ = β. We thus have
δ ≥ ξ
(α− β) + α ξ
Consider now the case of umbrella branding and the equilibrium whereby loss of
trust follows any product failure occurrence. In the appendix I show that the binding
constraint corresponds to offering low quality in both products. The no-deviation
constraint is then given by
2 (pi − ) + δ ρ 2 (pi − )
1− ρ δ ≥ 2pi + δ ρ
′ 2 (pi − )
1− ρ δ ,
Dividing through by two, we get an expression identical to (1). The difference
between no umbrella branding and the form of umbrella branding we are considering
resides in the values of the continuation probabilities ρ, ρ′. Specifically, under the
umbrella branding equilibrium we are considering, we have ρ = α2 and ρ′ = β2. The
condition on δ is therefore
δ ≥ ξ
(α2 − β2) + α2 ξ
Notice that the continuation probability, ρ, under no umbrella branding, ρ = α, is
lower than the continuation probability under umbrella branding, ρ = α2. Moreover,
the differential in continuation probabilities, ρ′ − ρ, is given by ρ′ − ρ = α − β
under no umbrella branding and ρ′ − ρ = α2 − β2 under umbrella branding. If
α + β < 1, then α − β > α2 − β2. We thus conclude that, if α + β < 1, then the
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quality provision set is greater under no-umbrella branding (with respect to umbrella
branding and punishing any deviation). Intuitively, punishing any deviation lowers
the equilibrium value (lower continuation probability) with respect to no-umbrella
branding. Formally, we have ρ = α2 instead of ρ = α. Moreover, if α+ β < 1, then
punishing only one deviation increases the incentives for shirking.
If α+β > 1, then we have two counteracting effects: equilibrium value is greater
under no umbrella branding; but the decline in continuation probabilities is greater
under umbrella branding (harsher punishment). In this case, no umbrella branding
is better only if ξ is high enough, specifically, if
ξ ≡ 
pi −  > ξ1 =
(α− β) (α+ β − 1)
(1− α)α
A similar intuition applies to comparison between no umbrella branding and the
policy of umbrella branding and the equilibrium where only two simultaneous prod-
uct failures lead to the loss of reputation. In this case, the continuation probability
favors the umbrella branding equilibrium. In fact, ρ = 1− (1−α)2, which is greater
than α. However, the differential in continuation probabilities favors no umbrella
branding. As before, if ξ is sufficiently high then the first effect dominates, and
umbrella branding leads to a higher set of values of the discount factor.
So far I have only considered the intuition for the relative size of the sets of
the discount factor such that a quality equilibrium exists. Going from here to
optimal equilibria is easy. In fact, the continuation probability is highest under
umbrella branding and punishment of two simultaneous product failures, and lowest
under umbrella branding and punishment of any product failure. It follows that,
whenever more than one solution is feasible, umbrella branding and punishment
of two simultaneous product failures is preferable to both umbrella branding and
punishment of any product failure and no umbrella branding; and no umbrella
branding is preferable to umbrella branding and punishment of any product failure.
Stochastic reputation updating. Throughout the paper, I have assumed
that consumers follow a deterministic reputation procedure. Alternatively, I could
consider the possibility of a random transition process. Specifically, suppose that,
following one single product failure, consumers lose trust in the brand with proba-
bility θ1, whereas two simultaneous product failures lead to reputation breakdown
with probability θ2. The situation I considered in the previous sections thus corre-
sponds to the extreme cases when θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 1, or θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 0. What
if we allow for any values θi ∈ [0, 1]?
It can be shown that the optimal solution is to choose the lowest values of θ
consistent with the no deviation constraints. Specifically, for very low values of δ,
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even if θ1 = θ2 = 1 no equilibrium exists other than the repetition of the static Nash
equilibrium. If δ = δ1, where δ1 is derived in Proposition 4 and illustrated in Figure
1, setting θ1 = θ2 = 1 just satisfies the no-deviation constraint. As the value of δ
increases, the optimal value of θ1 is decreased, keeping θ2 = 1. For δ = δ3, where
δ3 is derived in Proposition 4 and illustrated in Figure 1, θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 1 just
satisfies the no-deviation constraint. Finally, for higher values of δ, that is, δ > δ3,
the optimal solution consist of setting θ1 = 0 and θ2 to the lowest value consistent
with the no-deviation constraint (of shirking in one product only).8
Intuitively, the idea is to concentrate punishment as much as possible in the
event of two simultaneous product failures. The optimal solution then “convexifies”
the solution determined in Proposition 4.
In many applications it may not be realistic to assume consumers play a random
strategy. However, an alternative interpretation of consumer random strategies is
that each consumer loses trust with probability θi. To the extent that firms are risk
neutral and there is a continuum of consumers, the firm’s value is the same when all
consumers leave the firm with probability θ or a fraction θ leaves with probability
1.
4 Concluding remarks
Although I do not develop a full theory of optimal brand size, my results provide
some pointers towards the costs and the benefits from umbrella branding. The
benefits from umbrella branding may come from one of two sources: if the discount
factor is sufficiently high, then umbrella branding allows for an equilibrium with a
softer punishment (specifically, the equilibrium where consumers only lose trust in
a brand when they observe two simultaneous product failures). If, by contrast, the
discount factor is very small, then umbrella branding may allow for an equilibrium
where quality is supplied at all (specifically, the equilibrium where consumers lose
trust following any product failure).
Against these benefits, we must also consider the potential costs arising from
umbrella branding. Under the equilibrium where any product failure is punished by
loss of trust in the brand, the seller is subject to an unfortunate “domino” effect:
a bad signal in one product kills two streams of revenue and profit. If the no-
deviation constraint is satisfied under no umbrella branding, then the latter is the
better choice. In fact, under no umbrella branding, the effect of a product failure is
limited to the profit stream from the product that failed.
8The technical details of this derivation are available upon request.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Since quality is a deterministic function of the firm’s
effort, the best case for an efficient equilibrium is for consumers’ to impose the
harshest “punishment” on a firm that shirks (Abreu, 1986). I will thus assume that,
following product failure, consumers lose their trust in the brand and never purchase
again. Make the equilibrium hypothesis that an equilibrium exists whereby a firm
makes effort in every period. The firm’s value is then given by
v =
pi − 
1− δ .
If the firm were not to make effort in a given period, it would earn pi during that pe-
riod but zero in all future periods, since its brand would lose its trustworthiness. It
follows that the seller’s no-deviation constraint is given by v > pi, or simply δ > /pi.
Given this, the consumers’ beliefs along the equilibrium path are consistent, and so
is their strategy.
Proof of Proposition 2: Given the same reasoning as in the proof of Propo-
sition 1, I consider extreme consumer punishments. Specifically, I assume that,
following any product failure, consumers lose their trust in the brand and never
purchase again. Given this form of punishment, the binding no-deviation constraint
corresponds to the firm shirking in both products. But then both the expected value
along the equilibrium path and the expected payoff from shirking are twice what
they are in the no-deviation of a one-product firm.
Proof of Proposition 3: Given Assumption 1, an optimal equilibrium is one that
leads the firm to invest in quality. In order for the solution to be an equilibrium,
we must impose an incentive compatibility constraint on the firm, namely that it
is better off by offering high quality. Given the simple nature of the consumers’
strategies, the only hope for an efficient equilibrium is that, just as in the case
of perfect monitoring, consumers “punish” the firm by losing trust in the brand
whenever low quality is observed. In fact, were consumers not to punish the firm,
then it would be the latter’s dominant strategy not to offer quality.
Under the equilibrium assumption that consumers punish the firm for a product
that breaks down, the firm’s no-deviation constraint is derived as follows. If the firm
invests in quality, then its expected value is pi − , net revenues during the current
period, plus δ α v, where v is the firm’s value. By shirking today, the firm receives
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profits pi today but only δ β v in the future. The no-deviation constraint is therefore
pi − + δ α v ≥ pi + δ β v (2)
Under the equilibrium hypothesis that the seller chooses quality in every period
until trust is broken, firm value is given by
v = pi − + δ α v,
or simply
v =
pi − 
1− δ α . (3)
Substituting (3) for v in (2), and solving for δ, we get
δ ≥ 
pi (α− β) + β  , (4)
and the result follows.
Lemma 1 Under umbrella branding, the no-deviation constraint corresponding to
shirking in n products (n = 1, 2) is given by
δ ≥ ξ
(3− n) (ρ− ρ′) + ρ ξ
where ρ is the equilibrium continuation probability, ρ′ the continuation probability
conditional on shirking, and ξ ≡ pi− . Moreover, under no umbrella branding, the
no-deviation constraint has the same form as under umbrella branding and n = 2.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider first the case of no umbrella branding. The no-
deviation constraint is given by
(pi − ) + δ ρ (pi − )
1− ρ δ ≥ pi + δ ρ
′ (pi − )
1− ρ δ , (5)
This is equivalent to
−+ δ ρ (pi − )
1− ρ δ ≥ δ ρ
′ (pi − )
1− ρ δ
−ξ + δ ρ 1
1− ρ δ ≥ δ ρ
′ 1
1− ρ δ
δ (ρ− ρ′) ≥ ξ (1− ρ δ)
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Finally, solving with respect to ξ we get
δ ≥ ξ
(ρ− ρ′) + ρ ξ (6)
Consider now the case of umbrella branding and the no-deviation constraint corre-
sponding to shirking on two products, n = 2. The no-deviation constraint is given
by
2 (pi − ) + δ ρ 2 (pi − )
1− ρ δ ≥ 2pi + δ ρ
′ 2 (pi − )
1− ρ δ ,
Dividing through by 2, we get an expression identical to (5). Consider now the case
of shirking on one product only. The no-deviation constraint is now given by
2 (pi − ) + δ ρ 2 (pi − )
1− ρ δ ≥ 2pi − + δ ρ
′ 2 (pi − )
1− ρ δ ,
This is equivalent to
−+ δ ρ 2 (pi − )
1− ρ δ ≥ δ ρ
′ 2 (pi − )
1− ρ δ
−ξ + δ ρ 2
1− ρ δ ≥ δ ρ
′ 2
1− ρ δ
2 δ (ρ− ρ′) ≥ ξ (1− ρ δ)
Finally, solving with respect to ξ we get
δ ≥ ξ
2 (ρ− ρ′) + ρ ξ (7)
Putting together (6) and (7), Lemma 1 follows.
Lemma 2 Under umbrella branding, (a) if consumers lose trust following any prod-
uct failure, then the binding no-deviation constraint is to shirk on both products; (b)
if consumers lose trust following two simultaneous product failures, then the binding
no-deviation constraint is to shirk on one product only.
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider the case of umbrella branding with punishment of
any product failure. In this case, ρ = α2. If the seller shirks in both products, then
ρ′ = ρ′2 = β2. If the seller shirks in one product then ρ′ = ρ′1 = αβ. Applying
Lemma 1, we see that the lowest value of δ under two deviations is higher than the
lowest value of δ under one deviation only if and only if
(ρ− ρ′2) < 2 (ρ− ρ′1)
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which is equivalent to
(α2 − β2) < 2 (α2 − αβ) (8)
(α+ β) (α− β) < 2α (α− β)
(α+ β) < 2α
β < α
Consider now the case of umbrella branding with punishment of two simultaneous
product failures. In this case, ρ = 1− (1−α)2. If the seller shirks in both products,
then ρ′ = ρ′2 = 1 − (1 − β)2. If the seller shirks in one product then ρ′ = ρ′1 =
1− (1−α) (1− β). Applying Lemma 1, we see that the lowest value of δ under two
deviations is lower than the lowest value of δ under one deviation only if and only if
(ρ− ρ′2) > 2 (ρ− ρ′1)
which is equivalent to(
1− (1− α)2
)
−
(
1− (1− β)2
)
> 2
((
1− (1− α)2
)
−
(
1− (1− α) (1− β)
))
(
2α− α2
)
−
(
2β − β2
)
> 2
((
2α− α2
)
−
(
α+ β − 2αβ
))
(
β2 − α2
)
> 2
(
αβ − α2
)
,
which is equivalent to (8).
Proof of Proposition 4: Generally speaking, equilibrium value is given by
v =
2 (pi − )
1− ρ δ ,
where ρ is the continuation probability. Under no umbrella branding, ρ = α. Un-
der umbrella branding and punishment of any product failure, ρ = α2. Finally,
under umbrella branding and punishment of two simultaneous product failures,
ρ = 1 − (1 − α)2. It follows that, if the respective no-deviation constraints are
satisfied, equilibrium value is highest under umbrella branding and punishment of
two simultaneous product failures, next under no umbrella branding, and finally
under umbrella branding and punishment of any product failure. I next show when
each proposed solution satisfies the no-deviation constraints.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, the lower bounds on the value of the discount factor as as
follows. Under no umbrella branding, the equilibrium continuation probability is α,
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whereas the continuation probability is given by β. It follows that the no-deviation
constraint is given by
δ >
ξ
(α− β) + ρ ξ .
Under umbrella branding and the strategy of punishing any product failure, the
continuation probability, ρ, is equal to α2. By Lemma 2, the binding deviation is
shirking in both products, so ρ′ = β2. From Lemma 1, it follows that
δ >
ξ
(α2 − β2) + ρ2 ξ .
Finally, under umbrella branding and the strategy of only punishing two simulta-
neous occurrences of product failure, the continuation probability, ρ, is equal to
1 − (1 − α)2. By Lemma 2, the binding deviation is shirking in both products, so
ρ′ = 1− (1− α) (1− β). From Lemma 1, it follows that
δ >
ξ(
1− (1− α)2
)
−
(
1− (1− β)2
)
+
(
1− (1− α)2
)
ξ
.
It follows that the lower bound on the discount factor under umbrella branding with
punishment of any product failure is lower than that under no umbrella branding if
and only if
(α2 − β2) + ρ2 ξ > (α− β) + ρ ξ,
which is equivalent to
ξ < ξ1 =
(α− β) (α+ β − 1)
(1− α)α
Moreover, the lower bound on the discount factor under umbrella branding with
punishment of two product failures is lower than that under no umbrella branding
if and only if(
1− (1− α)2
)
−
(
1− (1− β)2
)
+
(
1− (1− α)2
)
ξ > (α− β) + ρ ξ,
which is equivalent to
ξ > ξ2 =
(α− β) (2α− 1)
(1− α)α
Finally, α > β implies that ξ2 > ξ1, which leads to the characterization in the
proposition.
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